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Abstract 
 
The issue of low-wage workers has received increased interest during last 
decades in many European countries. In this paper I analyse the patterns of low-wage 
employment in the Spanish labour market. Using a sample of Spanish workers 
extracted from the European Community Household Panel for the period 1995-2001, I 
first analyse the earnings distribution as a whole, looking at the characteristics of low, 
medium and high paid jobs. I also look at the evolution of these jobs over the period 
1995-2001. Furthermore, I examine the determinants of being in a low-paid job using 
an analytical framework that is characterised by the ability to account for the 
endogeneity of initial conditions. Finally, I explore the effects of low pay on job 
mobility. For this purpose I adopt an approach based on competing risks in order to 
allow for different risks of failure. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The analysis of the structure of wages and wage inequality has been receiving 
increased attention in recent years. This interest has been reinforced by the sharp 
increase in wage inequalities in a number of industrial countries. This widening of 
earnings differentials has been common in many OECD countries, which has given 
rise to increased analysis of the so-called “low-paid” jobs. 
The extent of low pay at any point in time is a cause of concern as it measures 
the proportion of workers lagging behind in the wage distribution with negative 
consequences for their relative living standards and social inclusion. It is also 
important for the economy as a whole inasmuch at it signals the corresponding extent 
of low productivity or low paid jobs. The issue becomes even more crucial in a 
dynamic context, in the case of workers that are trapped in low paid jobs and do not 
have the prospect of a career that evolves over time. 
The growing interest in the development of low-wage employment in Europe 
in the last twenty years has firstly been due to the prospect of reducing unemployment 
through the creation of large number of low-paid, low-skill jobs. Among European 
countries, Spain is well known for having displayed one of the highest unemployment 
rates, with an average unemployment rate close to 20% since the mid 1980s. 
Employment creation has been one of the major issues that have confronted Spanish 
governments since the 1980. In 1984 the tripartite Economic and Social Agreement 
(AES) introduced a wide range of measures for temporary employment, which have 
probably been responsible for the good record of labour creation that came about 
between 1984 and 1991. These measures included fixed-term contracts free of hiring 
costs and temporary contracts, which were confined to unemployed and to workers 
under 25 years old. As the protection of permanent workers remained essentially 
unchanged, this deregulation brought about labour market segmentation. During the 
period 1992-1994 real wages and unit labour costs had been falling. Nonetheless, the 
unemployment rate did not experience a noticeable reduction. By 1994 one third of 
the Spanish workforce was hired under temporary contracts, one of the highest levels 
in the EU. Furthermore, more than 90% of all new contracts were temporary. The 
PSOE government then recognised the urgent need for further actions to resolve these 
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problems and set out to increase the flexibility of the labour market. The 1994 reform 
put forward specific limits on the use of fixed-term contracts, and it also extended the 
subsidies and incentives to promote the conversion of fixed-term contracts into 
permanent ones. However, with this reform the socialist government unsuccessfully 
attempted to reduce the temporary rate at 34%. The starting point for the 1997 reform 
was an unemployment rate of 21.49% at the beginning of 1997, and a high level of 
insecure employment. The main novelty of this reform was the introduction of a new 
permanent employment contract with lower firing costs in case of unfair dismissals.  
As both the 1994 and 1997 labour market reforms in Spain have mainly aimed 
at undoing the liberalization of fixed-term employment contracts and reducing the 
incidence of temporary employment, low-wage employment could have been 
significantly affected by these reforms. In this paper I use panel data on Spanish 
workers over the period 1995-2001 to shed some light about the incidence of low-
wage employment in Spain. First I analyse the overall earnings distribution, including 
a comparison between low, medium and high paid jobs. Next, I concentrate on low 
pay and I explore how it has evolved over time, and whether the incidence of low pay 
has shifted from some groups to others. I then proceed to a more in-depth analysis of 
the characteristics and factors associated with low-wage employment. For this 
purpose I estimate a model on the determinants of low-wage employment which is 
robust to the endogenous selection produced by the so-called “initial conditions 
problem”. Finally, I exploit the longitudinal aspect of the data to analyse the incidence 
of “low pay” on job mobility. For this purpose, and in order to distinguish between 
transitions from job to job and from job to “non-employment”, I adopt a discrete-time 
competing risks model where unobserved heterogeneity is also taken into account.  
The paper is set out as follows. The next section provides a short review of 
previous research. Section 3 discusses how to define low pay. Section 4 illustrates the 
data set used, while Section 5 provides a full descriptive analysis of the selected 
sample. In Section 6 I analyse the determinants of low-wage employment. Section 7 
focuses on job mobility, and Section 8 concludes. 
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2 Previous research 
 
In recent years low pay has become one of the key topics of economic and 
social policy in Europe and the USA. Low-wage employment has been a focus of 
research and policy interest both at a macro level, and from a micro perspective 
(OECD, 1996; Asplund et al., 1998; Lucifora and Salverda, 1998; Salverda et al., 
2000; Marx and Salverda, 2005). Most of these works have paid particular attention to 
differences between some European countries and the USA regarding the incidence of 
low-wage employment. These studies reveal that the United States is perhaps the 
extreme case where real wages at the lower end of the distribution have actually 
fallen, although the incidence of low-wage employment is also important in many 
European countries.  
Recently, the European Commission has provided some comparative data 
about the incidence of low-wage employment among the European countries1. The 
analysis is based on data from the European Community Household Panel (1994-
2001), and it reveals that low pay concerns roughly 15% of EU workers in paid 
employment of 15 hours or more per week. Furthermore, it provides evidence of little 
variation in the incidence of low pay between 1995 and 2000, with a decrease from 
15.6% in 1995 to 14.9% in 1998, rising again but only marginally in 1999 and 2000 to 
15.1%. However, there exist wide variations between different Member States, with 
the highest incidence of low pay in the UK and Ireland (19.4% and 18.7% 
respectively in 2000), and lowest in Denmark and Italy (8.6% and 9.7% respectively).  
The analysis also reveals a marked decline on the incidence of low-wage employment 
in Spain (from 18.9% in 1995 to 15.6% in 2000) and Portugal (from 14.4% to 10.9%), 
while the Netherlands and Germany have experienced an appreciable increase (from 
13.3% in 1995 to 16.6% in 2000 in the Netherlands, and from 13.9% in 1998 to 
15.7% in 2000 in Germany). 
Previous research has also examined the link between low pay and wage-
setting institutions (Blau and Kahn, 1996; Fortin and Lemieux, 1997; Gregory and 
Sandoval, 1994; OECD, 1996, 1998; Rubery and Fagan, 1993). In a recent work, 
Lucifora et al. (2005) review the patterns of low pay in Europe and show that union 
                                                 
1 European Community: “Labour market transitions and advancement: temporary employment and low 
pay in Europe”, chap 4, in Employment in Europe, 2004. 
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density, collective bargaining coverage and the structure of wage negotiations jointly 
contribute to reduce the incidence of low pay. Other papers have analysed the 
relationship between low pay and employment creation, competitiveness, technology 
and minimum wages (Card and Krueger, 1995; Dolado et al., 1996; Fernie and 
Metcalf, 1996; Machin and Manning, 1996; Schechter, 1993; and Shaheed, 1994).  
A recent examination of countries with national minimum wages found the 
expected relationship: lower minima were associated with higher aggregate rates of 
low pay (OECD, 1998). In Spain, a statutory minimum wage is set by the 
government, but it is combined with weak or uneven collective bargaining. In 
addition, the minimum wage rates are set at very low levels and have restricted 
coverage. Furthermore, the rate relative to average earnings has been decreasing over 
time in Spain, and there is limited protection for younger workers and some non-
compliance in keeping to rates at or above the minimum. However, although Spain 
had weak and uneven system of minimum wages, the presence of the legally binding 
collective agreements and minimum wages contributed to lower percentages of low 
pay than in Britain or the USA (see Robson, et al. (1999)). 
 
3 Measure of low pay 
 
Measurement of the incidence of low pay will be sensitive to: i) the way low 
pay is defined; ii) the earnings concept used; and iii) whether full-time and/or part-
time workers are included. However, economic theory does not provide us with any 
clear evidence on how low pay should be defined. The definition of low pay is in 
some sense arbitrary and several approaches have been used in the literature (CERC, 
1991; OECD, 1996 a). Low pay may be defined in absolute or relative terms. Using a 
measure such as the lowest decile, quintile or third decile has the effect of accounting 
for a fixed percentage of all workers. The alternative of defining low pay as a 
percentage of median earnings allows for variations in the proportion defined as low-
paid over time, and therefore is more suitable for studying whether low-employment 
is a temporary or permanent phenomenon.  
Proposed low pay thresholds are typically expressed as some fraction of either 
the mean or the median. In this paper I define workers in low-paid jobs as those 
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earning less than two-thirds of the median, while workers in high-paid jobs are 
defined as those earning one-and-a-half times the median earnings or more2. In 
addition, low pay is measured in terms of hourly gross earnings. Focusing on hourly 
earnings has a number of advantages. In particular, it allows both full-time and part-
time employees to be included and compared on a meaningful basis.  
 
4 Data 
 
Longitudinal data are essential to conduct both cross-sectional and dynamic 
analysis. In this paper I use data from the European Community Household Panel, 
which forms the most closely co-ordinated component of the European system of 
social surveys. It occupies a central position in the development of comparable social 
statistics across Member States on income including social transfers, labour poverty 
and social exclusion, housing, health, as well as various other indicators relating to the 
living conditions of private households and persons. It is, therefore, a harmonized 
longitudinal survey that makes it possible to follow up and interview the same private 
households and persons over several consecutive years.  
The analysis is based on the 1995-2001 waves of the ECHP for Spain, which 
is a relatively large sample. From these waves, I select a sample of wage and salary 
workers aged between 16 and 65 years old and working more than 15 hours per 
week3, so that self-employed and unpaid family-employed workers are not included. 
Hourly earnings are derived from information about monthly gross wages and the 
number of hours worked in a week. Finally, I use measures of low pay and high pay 
based on two-thirds and one-and-a-half times the median earnings, respectively. 
                                                 
2 Therefore, medium paid jobs are defined as those workers earning between two-thirds and one-and-a-
half times the median earnings. 
3 I focus the analysis on the seven latest waves of the survey since the type of contract is not observed 
in the 1994 survey.  Furthermore, people working less than 15 hours per week are not included in the 
analysis since information on the number of hours worked in a week is not available for them. 
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5 Descriptive analysis 
 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of low, medium, and high-wage employment 
over the period 1995-2001. As can be observed, low-paid jobs show the lowest 
participation over total employment during the whole period (between 15 and 20 per 
cent). And they present a slightly decreasing trend especially after 1998. In contrast, 
the highest participation rate corresponds to people employed in medium-paid jobs. 
Furthermore, the proportion of people falling in this type of jobs has increased from 
about 50 per cent in 1995 to 60 per cent in 2001. Finally, high-paid jobs have an 
intermediate share and show a slightly decreasing trend. 
Table 1 reports the proportions of people falling in these three categories for 
the initial and final years of the period under study. The descriptive analysis 
incorporates both personal and job characteristics: gender, age education, on-the-job 
training, unemployment history, experience with current employer, part-time/full-
time, type of firm, type of contract, occupation and industry 4. A cross-sectional 
analysis for the first period, 1995, is provided in Table 2. In this table I present the 
results of estimating separate probit models for the probabilities of being in low, 
medium, or high-paid jobs. Several points are worthy of mentioning. First, remarkable 
gender differences become apparent. Males are clearly more likely than females to be 
employed in either medium or high-paid jobs, while less likely to suffer from low-
wage employment.  
As age is concerned, the results confirm the general view that youths are much 
more often found in low-paid jobs than older persons.  
Important differences in the earnings distribution are also observed when 
looking at different levels of education.  As expected, higher educational levels are 
found to be more closely related to better paid jobs, while people with the lower 
educational attainments tend to be more likely to fall in low-wage employment. 
Having a part-time job, receiving on-the-job training and holding a permanent 
contract exert a negative and significant effect on the likelihood of being low-paid. In 
                                                 
4 The classification of occupations follows the one-digit level of the National Classification of 
Occupations (CNO-94), which is the most recent Spanish adaption of the International Standard 
Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88). 
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contrast, the effect of these three explanatory factors is found to be positive and 
significant when estimating the probability of being high-paid. 
Clearly differences are also observed when looking at the type of firm. People 
employed in small private firms are the most likely to suffer from low-wage 
employment while the least likely to occupy high-paid jobs. 
The individual unemployment history is another important factor that affects 
the likelihood of being employed in either low, medium, or high-paid jobs. In 
particular, those workers with previous unemployment experiences exhibit a higher 
probability of being low-paid while a lower probability of being high-paid.  
Finally, the results show how the likelihood of being employed in either low, 
medium or high paid is significantly affected by occupation and industry. Taking 
“service workers and shop and market sales workers” as the reference category, I find 
that people employed as legislators, senior officials and managers, professionals, 
technicians and associate professionals and clerks are clearly less likely to be low-
paid. Furthermore, people employed in industry are found to be less likely to suffer 
from low-wage employment while more likely to be high-paid than those employed in 
services. 
 The remaining part of this section focuses on low pay. In order to examine 
how low-wage employment has evolved over the period 1995-2001, I present a 
sequence of graphs for the incidence of low-wage employment by different personal 
and job characteristics5. Among personal characteristics I consider gender, age and 
education. With respect to job characteristics, I include the type of firm, the type of 
contract, full-time/part-time job, occupation and industry.  
 
5.1 Characteristics of low-paid workers 
 
Figure 2 presents the evolution of low-wage employment by gender. For both, 
males and females the figure shows a decreasing trend in the proportion of people 
employed in this type of jobs. However, females are clearly more likely to suffer from 
a low pay situation. In 1995, for instance, almost 30% of females were employed in a 
low-paid job, while the corresponding percentage for males was 15%.  
                                                 
5 See the Appendix. 
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In Figure 3 I report the evolution of low-wage employment for different age 
groups. In particular, I consider three different age groups: people aged between 16-
24 years old, those aged 25-49 years old, and those between 50-65 years old. 
Comparisons across the age cohorts show a remarkably higher incidence of low-wage 
employment amongst the youngest cohorts. This is not surprising since the Spanish 
youth labour market is characterized by low wages relative to adults, as well as high 
relative rates of unemployment. Furthermore, we observe that the differences between 
young and adult workers become smaller after 1997. This result can be linked to the 
substantial rise in the ratio between youth and adult minimum wages that has gone 
from 40% before 1990 to 77% in 1995 and to 89% in 1997, the latter increase due to 
the agreement of equalizing teenage minimum wage to the adult level. 
These previous results confirm that females and young workers in Spain not 
only are the most affected by the highest unemployment rates but they also suffer 
from a higher incidence of low pay. In this sense, we can set out that both females and 
young workers may be considered as disadvantaged groups in the Spanish labour 
market.  
Finally, Figure 4 shows the evolution of the percentage of people falling below 
two-thirds of the median earnings by different educational levels: primary, secondary 
and tertiary education. As expected, individuals with just primary education 
completed are the most likely of being in a low-paid job, while those with tertiary 
education completed exhibit the lowest incidence of low pay. In 1995, for instance, 
around 25% of people with primary education were in a low-paid job, while the 
corresponding percentage for those with tertiary education was 5%, and these 
differences remain more or less unchanged over the whole period. 
 
5.2 Characteristics of low-paid jobs 
 
As concerned job characteristics, I first analyse the evolution of low-wage 
employment by different types of firm. I first distinguish between public and private 
sector, and then, within the private sector, between small (less than 50 employees), 
medium (50-500 employees) and large firms (more than 500 employees). As it can be 
observed in Figure 5, clear differences become apparent between the different types of 
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firms. Small private firms are clearly the most likely to have a high incidence of low 
pay. This is not surprising, since small firms are far more likely than the average to 
have no union recognition and be outside collective bargaining frameworks. In 
contrast, the lowest incidence of low-wage employment occurs in the public sector6. 
These differences remain quite significant over the whole period. However, one can 
notice a decrease in the incidence of low-wage employment in small private firms 
(from 30% in 1995 to 25% in 2001) while for the public sector the percentage remains 
unchanged (around 5%).  
In Figure 6 I distinguish between part-time and full-time jobs. The evolution 
of low-wage employment among part-time jobs is quite interesting. We start in 1995 
with almost 35% of people in part-time jobs being in a low pay situation, while the 
corresponding percentage for people in full-time jobs was less than 20%. The 
incidence of low-wage employment among part-time jobs decreases in the following 
years, with a remarkable decrease from 1998 to 2000, and it increases substantially 
again from 2000 to 2001. This trend in the incidence of low pay among part-timers 
could be linked to the profile of this type of wage earners and the effects of the 1994 
and 1997 reforms. According to the Social and Economic Council report 7, which was 
based on data derived from the Labour Force Survey (EPA), most of part-time 
workers are married women over 30 years of age. They also have a low level of 
education and find employment in the least skilled sectors, mainly domestic services, 
retail and catering. With the 1994 reform there was an appearance of part-time 
employment amongst women with a higher level of education. In contrast, male part-
time employment is less significant, and male part-time workers tend to be young. 
Also, the higher the level of education and qualification, the greater is the tendency 
towards part-time employment among men. Another important change relating to 
part-time employment was introduced by the “April agreements” of 1997: part-time 
work has been redefined as “employment in which the number of hours is less than 
that of comparable full-time workers (i.e. in the same company or covered by the 
same collective agreement)”. 
                                                 
6 A possible explanation for the lowest percentages of low-paid in the public sector is that from 1986 to 
1992, Spanish public administration went through a phase of decentralization in which many secure 
well-paid civil servant jobs were created for both men and women. 
7 Social Economic Council report. “ El trabajo a tiempo parcial”. September 1996. 
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Differences in the evolution of low-wage employment by the type of contract 
are shown in Figure 7. As it can be observed, workers employed under a non-
permanent contract are much more likely to suffer from low pay, than those holding a 
permanent contract. However, the incidence of low pay among non-permanent 
contracts exhibits a decreasing trend over the period 1995-2001. Since “non-
permanent contract” includes: fixed-term or short-term contracts, casual work with no 
contract and some other working arrangements, the decreasing trend observed for this 
type of contracts could be the result of the 1994 and 1997 labour market reforms. The 
1994 reform was aimed at reducing the proportion of employees under fixed-term 
employment contracts. For that purpose, the employment protection legislation was 
changed widening the conditions for “fair” dismissals and restricting the conditions 
for the use of temporary contracts. In 1997 the employer confederation (CEOE) and 
the two major unions (UGT and CCOO) reached an agreement to reform the system 
of employment contracts and the structure of collective agreements. The main novelty 
of the reform was the introduction of a new permanent employment contract with 
lower firing costs in case of unfair dismissals. This amounted to a significant 
reduction of firing costs, which was thought necessary to promote employment 
creation and, above all, to reduce the incidence of temporary employment. However, 
after the reform the temporary rate was at 34%, still three times higher than the EU 
average and the new permanent contracts only represented 4% of total hiring. Being 
aware of this, the government introduced a new sort of contract called  “permanent 
employment promotion contracts” (“contrato para el fomento de la contratación 
indefinida”, CFCI) with low firing costs. It would be implemented for a period of four 
years with a subsequent evaluation process to decide whether to adopt it, abolish it or 
reform it. The CFCI applies to young workers (under 30), long-term unemployed 
(over 12 months) and over-45 unemployed. 
Figures 8 a) − c) reveal that the percentages of low-paid vary greatly by 
occupation. The lowest percentages are found among legislators, senior officials and 
managers and professionals, with less than 5% of people employed in these 
occupations suffering from low pay. In contrast, people employed in skilled 
agriculture and fishery workers; service workers and shop and market sales workers; 
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and those in elementary occupations show the highest incidence of low-wage 
employment. 
Finally, Figures 9 a) – c) explore industry variations regarding the incidence of 
low pay. The figures show remarkable sectoral variations in low pay, which is a 
common feature of countries with deregulated labour markets and uneven collective 
bargaining. In Figure 9 a) sectors with the highest incidence of low-wage employment 
are reported. This corresponds to: agriculture, wholesale and retail trade, repair of 
motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal/household goods; hotels and restaurants; 
and other community, social and personal service activities, private households with 
employed persons, extra-territorial organizations and bodies. In contrast low-wage 
employment is less likely among: financial intermediation; public administration and 
defense, compulsory social security; and education (see Figure 9 c)). 
 
6 The determinants of being in a low-paid job 
 
This section aims to provide a more in-depth analysis on the determinants of 
low-wage employment. If initial conditions were exogenous, a standard probit model 
would be applied to estimate the factors affecting the likelihood of being low-paid. 
However, if being initially employed is not exogenous, the estimated results obtained 
from a standard probit model would be biased. To account for this selection bias I use 
a bivariate probit model of the type used by Van de Ven and Van Praag (1981). Thus, 
the conditional probability of being in a low-paid job given that the individual is 
employed is given by: 
 
 
( )
( )
' '
2
'
, ;
Pr 1 i ii i
i
x z
w y
z
β γ ρδ γ
Φ⎡ < = ⎤ =⎣ ⎦ Φ  (1) 
 
where iw denotes the hourly earnings of individual i, 1iy =  if individual i is 
employed, iz  is the vector of factors that influence the probability of being employed, 
ix  is the vector of factors that determines the likelihood of low-employment, Φ is the 
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univariate standard normal cumulative distribution function, and 2Φ  is the cumulative 
distribution function of the bivariate standard normal. 
In the special case where 0ρ =  the conditional probability of being low-paid 
can be modelled using a standard probit approach. In contrast, if ρ  is non-zero the 
more general bivariate probit with selectivity, given by equation (1), is required and 
identification restrictions are needed to make the model credible. The extra variables 
in iz  not included in ix  can be viewed as instruments for the employment selection 
equation.  
The estimation results of this bivariate probit model are reported in Table 3. 
The dependent variable is dummy variable that takes value 1 if the individual has 
been low-paid at least once during the period 1995-2001, and takes value 0 if he/she 
has never been in a low pay situation. The explanatory variables in the main equation 
include both personal and job characteristics: gender, age, education, on-the-job 
training, a dummy variable indicating a part-time job, type of firm, type of contract, 
unemployment history, job duration, and a set of occupational, industry and yearly 
dummies. The selection equation contains the following explanatory factors: gender, 
marital status, age, education, a dummy variable indicating whether there are children 
younger than 14 years old in the household, household size, and two dummy variables 
indicating the financial situation of the household.  
The likelihood ratio test reveals that the correlation coefficient ρ  is 
significantly different from zero, which indicates the presence of a sample selection 
problem. Thus, failing to control for this selection bias could then lead to bias results 
regarding the factors affecting the probability of being in a low-paid job.  
The estimation results reveal that females have a higher probability of being 
low-paid compared with males.  
As age is concerned, effects tend to go in the expected direction. The 
likelihood of being in a low-paid job decreases with age. Workers aged between 16-
24 years emerged as having the highest probability of being low-paid. The fact that 
young workers account for a disproportionately large share of the people in low-paid 
jobs, of course, reflects low pay being linked to the life-cycle patterns of pay. The 
important point, however, is whether this is a temporary situation in their working 
careers. Young workers typically begin their working life in low-paid jobs. If these 
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low-paid jobs are “entry” jobs then it would be expected that, over time, these 
workers move to better paid jobs.  
Education also exerts a strong influence on the probability of being low-paid. 
As expected, higher educational levels are related with a lower probability of low pay. 
Thus, education has a beneficial effect in preventing a low-wage employment 
situation. 
Marginal effects associated to receiving on-the-job training and holding a 
permanent contract have a negative sign, which reveals that these two factors tend to 
decrease the likelihood of being in a low-paid job. 
As concerns the different types of firms, the results show that low pay 
probabilities tend to be significantly lower for employees in the public sector and the 
medium and large private firms compared to small private firms.  
Previous unemployment history is another important factor in explaining the 
probability of being in a low-paid job. Individuals with previous unemployment 
experience exhibit a higher probability of being low-paid. This result is not surprising 
since employers may interpret previous unemployment spells as a negative signal, or 
signals of low-productivity, so that they will be less prone to offer these workers a 
higher wage. 
The results also reveal a negative and significant influence of seniority on the 
likelihood of being in a low-paid job, which suggests that low pay mainly affects the 
early stage of a match between a worker and a job. This finding is somehow in line 
with the Matching Theory, (Jovanovic (1979 b)), which states that a match between a 
worker and a job can be treated as a pure experience good. The only way to determine 
the quality of a particular match is to form the match and to "experience it". Thus, it is 
not surprising that once the employer has realized about the “good quality” of the 
worker, he/she moves upwards in the earnings distribution.   
Finally, I find that both occupational and industry dummy variables are quite 
significant in determining the probability of being low-paid. This result suggests that 
low-wage employment is concentrated among certain types of occupations and 
sectors, as it could be observed in the Figures 8 a) – 9 c). 
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7 Mobility 
 
From a welfare point of view it is important to address the question whether 
low pay is a transitory phenomenon of a worker’s life, as predicted by the human 
capital theory, or whether it is a more serious and long lasting problem. If low pay is a 
temporary situation in the working career of individuals, we should expect low-paid 
workers having a higher probability of changing job.  
In this section I explore the effects of low pay on job mobility. I look at both, 
transitions from job to job and transitions to non-employment8, and I investigate 
whether being low-paid significantly influences the likelihood of an individual to 
change job or to move towards non-employment. For this purpose I consider a 
discrete-time competing risks model. The reason of using discrete-time techniques is 
not only that data are observed in discrete intervals (namely, in years), but also that 
these techniques are flexible enough for estimating the time-dependence of the hazard 
rate (see Meyer, 1990).  
Competing risks models occur when failure can arise from two or more 
sources. In this case an employment spell can end with either a new job or with a 
transition to non-employment. This distinction may be important, since restricting the 
estimated coefficients of the baseline hazard and the covariates to be the same for all 
destination states might be an unduly restrictive assumption.9  
The model can be formulated assuming the existence of two independent 
random variables 1T  and 2T , one of each destination, and supposing that the actual 
destination entered is determined by the minimum of the { }jT , ( )1, 2j = , which is the 
duration I actually observe. I then define 1φ  and 2φ  as the two hazard functions for the 
two different risks of failure. Thus, when analysing for example the determinants of 
changing job, the spells which end with a transition to non-employment are treated as 
censored as the point of exit, and the same applies for the other risk of failure. I will 
use a logistic distribution to model the hazard rates, following Bover et al. (2002) and 
García-Pérez (1997), so that the two conditional exit rates can be written as follows: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 0 1t F t t x tφ θ θ= +  (2) 
                                                 
8 Within “non-employment” I include unemployment, inactivity and discouraged workers. 
9 See Lancaster (1990) for a detailed description of competing risks models. 
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 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )2 0 1t F t t x tφ γ γ= +  (3) 
where x(t) denotes the vector of explanatory variables, which includes personal 
(gender, age, education, on-the-job training, unemployment history, and experience 
with current employer), job characteristics (part-time/full-time, type of firm, type of 
contract, occupation and industry) and a dummy variable indicating low pay10. Apart 
from personal and job characteristics, I also took into account structural circumstances 
of the labour market by including as an explanatory variable the yearly unemployment 
rate, and a set of yearly dummy variables11. I denote ( )0 tθ and ( )0 tγ  as the additive 
terms of the duration dependence in the hazard rates that I will estimate in the most 
general way as possible. And finally, ( )1 tθ  and ( )1 tγ  represent the coefficients for 
the explanatory factors which in general depend on duration. 
I must first consider the question of whether the competing risks model is 
identified. It is relatively straightforward to demonstrate that if we had two vectors of 
covariates, 1x  and 2x  with non-identical variables, the model would be identified in 
the sense that an observationally equivalent independent competing risks model does 
not exist. However, in many econometric applications, as the one studied in this 
section, 1 2x x= , so that this convenient identifying assumption does not exist. 
However, Han and Hausman (1988) prove that identification of the bivariate 
competing risks model is guaranteed so long as at least two covariates are continuous, 
even if 1x  and 2x  are identical.
12  
Finally, it is well established that failing to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity in hazard models tends to create spurious duration-dependence in the 
estimated baseline hazard, as well as bias the parameter estimates for the covariates 
(see, for example, Flinn and Heckman 1982, Lancaster, 1979; 1990). More 
particularly, unobserved heterogeneity could be an important consideration when 
estimating hazard rates from employment (Farber, 1994). Unobserved characteristics, 
such as motivation, effort, the propensity to take leisure on the job (to ‘shirk’), or 
                                                 
10 In addition, a cross dummy between low pay and log(t) has been included. 
11 For those individuals making a transition, either from job to job or from job to non-employment, I 
take the unemployment rate of the year previous to the transition. In contrast, for those individuals who 
remain in the same job, I take the unemployment rate at year of first interview. 
12 This result generalizes to additional competing risks where the number of continuous variables must 
be at least as great as the number of competing risks. 
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strong social or family pressure to remain in work may influence job tenure. Ignoring 
this unobserved heterogeneity can bias the effect of the covariates. Hence, in order to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity I formulate the following expressions for the 
two hazard rates:   
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 0 1,t u F t t x t uφ θ θ= + +  (4) 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )2 0 1,t u F t t x t uφ γ γ= + +  (5) 
 
where u denotes the unobserved heterogeneity parameter. 
I estimate the two hazard rates, given by (4) and (5), simultaneously. 
Furthermore, I will follow a semi-parametric approach for unobserved heterogeneity 
based on Heckman and Singer (1984). In particular, I will assume that it follows a 
two-mass points discrete distribution function and I estimate the model by maximum 
likelihood. The likelihood contribution of each individual i in the sample, conditional 
on u  would take the form: 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
1 11 1
2 22 2
1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1
1 1
2 2 2 2
1 1
1 1
1 1
i i
i i
d dt t
i i i i
s s
d dt t
i i i
s s
L u s t s
s t s
φ φ φ
φ φ φ
− −
= =
− −
= =
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
∏ ∏
∏ ∏
 (6) 
 
where 1t  and 2t  represent observed durations (completed or censored), and 1id  and 
2id  define the two indicators that allow to distinguish between censored and 
uncensored observations for the two risks of failure respectively. Given ( )iL u , the log 
likelihood function can be written as follows:  
 ( ) ( )
1
ln ln
N
i
i
L L u dF u
=
= ∑ ∫  (7) 
 
where ( )F u  is a discrete distribution function with two-mass points, 1u  and 2u . 
Besides, the probability p for the variable u  to be equal to its value 1u  is also 
estimated.  
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Tables 4 collects the results obtained from estimating equations (2) and (3), 
while simultaneous estimation results of equations (4) and (5) are reported in Table 5. 
In both cases the estimated coefficient on the dummy variable “Low pay” results to be 
positive and very significant when estimating transitions job-to-job. Therefore, as 
expected, low-paid workers are found to be more likely to change job. This is quite 
reasonable since job-to-job mobility would be a possible way for these workers to 
move upwards in the earnings distribution. In such a case, low-wage employment 
would be a temporary experience of the working career of individuals, and there 
would be less cause of concern than in a situation where individuals who enter low-
wage employment are unlikely to leave it. Nonetheless, the negative and significant 
coefficient on the variable Low pay * ln(t) reveals that this effect is reversed the 
longer the duration of the spell.  
The results also reveal that low-paid workers are more likely to move towards 
non-employment, and in this sense it can be said that these workers face a weaker 
position in the labour market compared to those earning above the low pay threshold.    
The unobserved heterogeneity parameter was found to be quite significant (see 
Table 5). In particular, the estimated distribution function reveal the existence of two 
different types of workers: with 84.30 percent probability, there exists a group of 
workers with a higher hazard rate either for transitions from job to job or to non-
employment. Furthermore, as regards the effects of unobserved heterogeneity on the 
estimated coefficients, a comparison between the results reported in Tables 4 and 5 
reveals that, in general, the estimated coefficients (in absolute terms) tend to be larger 
when unobserved factors are taken into account. However the estimated coefficient on 
the dummy variable “low pay” results to be positive but lower when accounting for 
unobserved heterogeneity. Moreover, the introduction of unobserved heterogeneity 
significantly improves the likelihood values. 
Regarding the effects of personal characteristics some points are worthy of 
mentioning. First, transitions from job to job and from job to non-employment are 
more likely among young workers (people under 25 years old). This result could be 
link to the temporary nature of the contracts that they hold. Finally, I find that both 
types of transitions are more likely among workers with previous unemployment 
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experience, and that receiving on-the-job training negatively affects the likelihood of 
moving towards non-employment.     
With respect job characteristics, I find, that being employed in small private 
firms and holding a non-permanent contract increase the likelihood of both changing 
job and moving towards non-employment.  
Apart from the variables on individual and job characteristics, the business 
cycle and the dummy “low pay”, duration-dependence has been taken into account 
through the inclusion of a two-degree polynomial in log(t) in the specification of the 
hazard rates. Figures 10 and 11 present the yearly Kaplan-Meier estimates for the two 
risks of failure both with, and without controlling for unobserved factors. As can be 
seen, the hazard rate for both risks is declining with employment duration especially 
between the first and second year. Furthermore, in both cases the hazard rate is found 
to be higher when unobserved factors are taken into account. 
 
8 Conclusion 
 
In this paper I have analysed the patterns of low-wage employment in Spain 
using micro data at the individual level extracted from the European Community 
Household Panel for the period 1995-2001.  
First, I analysed how low-wage employment has evolved over the period 
under analysis, looking at different individual and job characteristics. I also discussed 
the role of institutional mechanisms and the effects of the 1994 and 1997 labour 
market reforms on the observed trends in low-wage employment. Second, I proceed to 
a more in-depth analysis on the determinants of low-wage employment. For that 
purpose, I followed an econometric approach which is robust to the endogenous 
selection produced by the so-called “initial conditions problem”. As regards workers’ 
characteristics the results show that low-wage employment is more likely among 
females, youth, the low educated, workers who do not receive on-the-job training, 
workers with previous unemployment experience and workers with shorter experience 
with current employer. With respect job characteristics, low pay is found to be more 
likely among small private firms, non-permanent contracts and certain types of 
occupations and industries. 
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Finally, I analysed the incidence of low pay on mobility. A competing risk 
approach with unobserved heterogeneity has been adopted in order to distinguish 
between transitions from job to job and from job to non-employment. The results 
reveal that low-paid workers are more likely to either change job or move towards a 
non-employment situation.  
 22
References 
Asplund, R., Sloane, P., and Theodossiou, I. (1998). Low pay and Earnings Mobility in 
Europe. Edward Elgard (eds). Cheltenham, UK, Northampton, MA, USA. 
Bazen, S., Salverda, W., and Gregory, M. (1999). Low wage employment in Europe. Edward 
Elgard (eds). Cheltenham, UK, Northampton, MA, USA. 
Blau, F.D., and Kahn, L.M. (1996). “International Differences in Male Wage Inequality: 
Institutions Versus Market Forces”. Journal of Political Economy, 104, 791-836. 
Bover, O., Arellano, M., and Bentolila, S. (2002). “Unemployemnt Duration, Benefit 
Duration and the Business Cycle”. The Economic Journal. 112:223-265. 
Card, D., and Krueger, A.B. (1995). Myth and Measurement: The New Economics of the 
Minimum Wage. Princenton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Carrasco, R. (1999). “Transitions to and from Self-Employment in Spain: An Empirical 
Analysis”. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Vol 61 (3): 315-41. 
CERC, 1991. Centre d’Etudes sur le Revenu et les Coûts (CERC) (1991), Les bas salaries 
dans les pays members la Communanté Européenne, La Documentation Francaise, N 
101. Paris. 
Dolado, J., Felgueroso, F., and Jimeno, J.F. (1997). “The Effects of Minimum bargained 
wages on earnings: evidence from Spain”. European Economic Review, 41: 713-721. 
Dolado, J., Kramarz, F., Machin, S., Manning, A., Margolis, D., and Teulings, C. (1996). 
“The Economic Impact of Minimum Wages in Europe”. Economic Policy 33: 317-72. 
European Community (2004). “Labour Market Transitions and Advancement: Temporary 
Employment and Low Pay in Europe”, chap 4, in Employment in Europe, 2004.  
Farber, H. (1994). “The Analysis of Interfirm Worker Mobility”. Journal of Labour 
Economics, Vol 12: 554-594. 
Fernie, S., and Metcalf, D. (1996). “Low Pay and Minimum Wages: The British Evidence”. 
Special Report, Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics, 
September. 
Flinn, C.J., and Heckman, J.J. (1982). “Econometric Methods of Analyzing Labor Force 
Dynamics”. Journal of Econometrics, 18:115-168. 
García-Pérez, J.I (1997). “Las Tasas de Salida del Empleo y el Desempleo en España (1978-
1993). Investigaciones Económicas XXI(1): 29-53. 
García-Pérez, J.I., and Muñoz-Bullón F. (2005). “Are Temporary Help Agencies Changing 
Mobility Patterns in the Spanish Labour Market?”. Spanish Economic Review, 7: 43-65. 
 23
Gregory, M., and Sandoval, V. (1994). “Low Pay and Minimum Wage Protection in Britain 
and the EC”, in R. Barrell (eds.). The UK Labour Market, pp 158-82. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Han, A., and Hausman, J.A. (1988). “Identification of Continuous and Discrete Competing 
Risks Models”. Mimeo 
Han, A., and Hausman, J.A. (1990). “Flexible Parametric Estimation of Duration and 
Competing Risk Models”. Journal of Applied Econometrics, Vol 5 (1): 1-28. 
Heckman , J., and Singer, B.(1984). “A Method of Minimizing the Impact of Distributional 
Assumptions in Econometric Models for Duration Data”. Econometrica, 52: 271-320. 
Jovanovic, B. (1979). “Job Matching and Theory of Labor Turnover”. Journal of Political 
Economy, 87: 972-989. 
Lancaster, T. (1979). “Econometric Methods for the Analysis of Duration Data”, 
Econometrica, Vol 47 (4):939-956. 
Lancaster, T. (1990). The Econometric Analysis of Transition Data. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Lucifora, C., and Salverda, W (1998). Policies for Low Wage Employment and Social 
Exclusion. European Low-wage Employment Research Network. FrancoAngeli s.r.l, 
Milano, Italy. 
Lucifora, C., McKnight, A., and Salverda, W. (2005). “Low-wage employment in Europe: a 
review of the evidence”. Socio-Economic Review (2005) 3: 259-292. 
Machin, S., and Manning, A. (1996). “Employment and the Introduction of a Minimum Wage 
in Britain”. Economic Journal 106(May): 667-76. 
Marx, I., and Salverda, W. (2005). Low-wage Employment in Europe. Acco. 
Meyer, B.D. (1990). “Unemployment Insurances and Unemployment Spells”. Econometric 
Society Monograph 17, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA. 
OECD (1996, 1997, 1998), Employment Outlook, Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development. 
Robson, P., Dex, S., Wilkinson, F., and Salido Cortés, O. (1999). “Low Pay, Labour Market 
Institutions, Gender and Part-Time Work: Cross-National Comparisons”. European 
Journal of Industrial Relations. Vol 5(2): 187-207. 
Rubery, J., and Fagan, C. (1993). “Wage Determination and Sex Segregation in Employment 
in the European Community”, in Social Europe, Supplement 3/3. Report for the Equal 
Opportunities Unit, DGV. 
 24
Salverda, W., Lucifora, C., and Nolan, B. (2000). Policy Measures for Low-Wage 
Employment in Europe. Edward Elgard (eds). Cheltenham, UK, Northampton, MA, 
USA. 
Schechter, H.B. (1993). The Global Economic Mismatch: High Technology and Low Pay. 
London: Praeger. 
Shaheed, Z. (1994). “Minimum Wages and Low Pay: An ILO Perspective”. International 
Journal of Manpower 15(2/3): 49-61. 
Van de Ven, P., and van Praag, B. (1981). “The Demand for Deductibles in Private Health 
Insurance: A Probit Model with Sample Selection”. Journal of Econometrics, 17, pp 
229-52. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 25
APPENDIX 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 2: Evolution of low-wage employment by gender
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Figure 1: Evolution of low, medium and high-wage employment
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Figure 3: Evolution of low-wage employment by age groups
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Figure 4: Evolution of low-wage employment by education
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Figure 5: Evolution of low-wage employment by type of firm
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Figure 6: Evolution of low-wage employment part-time/full-time
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Time
%
 o
ve
r t
ot
al
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
Total
Part-time
Full-time
 27
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Evolution of low-wage employment by type of contract
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Figure 8 a): Evolution of low-wage employment by occupation
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Figure 8 b): Evolution of low-wage employment by occupation
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Figure 8 c): Evolution of low-wage employment by occupation
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Figure 9 a): Evolution of low-wage employment by industry
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Figure 9 b): Evolution of low-wage employment by industry
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Occupations: 
O1: Legislators, senior officials and managers. 
O2: Professionals 
O3: Technicians and associate professionals. 
O4: Clerks 
O5: Service workers and shop and market sales workers 
O6: Skilled agricultural and fishery workers 
O7: Craft and related trade workers 
O8: Plant and machine operators and assemblers. 
O9: Elementary occupations. 
 
Industry: 
Agriculture 
Industry 
Serv1: Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and 
personal/household goods 
Serv2: Hotels and restaurants 
Serv3: Transport, storage and communication 
Serv4: Financial intermediation 
Serv5: Real state, renting and business activities 
Serv6: Public administration and defense; compulsory social security 
Serv7: Education 
Serv8: Health and social work 
Figure 9 c): Evolution of low-wage employment by industry
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Serv9: Other community, social and personal service activities; private households with 
employed persons; extra-territorial organizations and bodies.
 31
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 10: Hazard job to job
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Figure 11: Hazard job to non-employment
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: Distribution of people in low-, medium-, and high-paid jobs 
 LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
 1995 
(20.53%) 
2001 
(16.23%) 
1995 
(53.87%) 
2001 
(60.95%) 
1995 
(25.99%) 
2001 
(22.81%) 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Male 0.539 0.426 0.692 0.634 0.687 0.669 
       
Age       
16-24 0.363 0.282 0.098 0.129 0.007 0.005 
25-49 0.537 0.6 0.727 0.740 0.776 0.735 
50-65 0.098 0.115 0.173 0.130 0.214 0.255 
       
Education       
Primary Ed. 0.712 0.615 0.608 0.483 0.211 0.153 
Second. Ed 0.197 0.225 0.214 0.233 0.181 0.173 
Tertiary Ed. 0.091 0.160 0.178 0.283 0.608 0.674 
       
Part-time job 0.096 0.119 0.059 0.070 0.035 0.044 
       
On-the-job training 0.094 0.1 0.228 0.253 0.572 0.608 
       
Type of firm       
Public 0.073 0.051 0.216 0.171 0.519 0.431 
Private (<50) 0.789 0.815 0.533 0.571 0.156 0.255 
Private (50-500) 0.110 0.119 0.173 0.209 0.133 0.207 
Private (>500) 0.028 0.015 0.076 0.048 0.191 0.107 
       
Permanent Contract 0.254 0.387 0.616 0.660 0.915 0.904 
       
Prev. unemployed 0.608 0.453 0.418 0.402 0.189 0.225 
       
Job duration       
<2 years 0.594 0.616 0.295 0.379 0.067 0.123 
2 – 5 years 0.166 0.184 0.140 0.213 0.068 0.131 
> 5 years 0.239 0.2 0.564 0.408 0.865 0.746 
       
Occupation       
Legislators, senior officials and managers 0.005 0.001 0.017 0.010 0.065 0.082 
Professionals 0.010 0.019 0.040 0.060 0.392 0.421 
Technicians and associate professionals 0.032 0.067 0.088 0.131 0.191 0.221 
Clerks 0.084 0.057 0.142 0.112 0.112 0.055 
Service workers and shop and market sales 
workers 
0.257 0.279 0.159 0.147 0.057 0.059 
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers 0.039 0.040 0.015 0.014 0 0 
Craft and related trade workers 0.180 0.160 0.240 0.240 0.103 0.086 
Plant and machine operators and assemblers 0.083 0.081 0.106 0.120 0.060 0.064 
Elementary occupations 0.308 0.294 0.192 0.165 0.018 0.011 
       
Type of industry       
Agriculture 0.092 0.089 0.032 0.034 0.002 0.007 
Industry 0.285 0.237 0.382 0.414 0.250 0.242 
Services 0.623 0.673 0.585 0.552 0.748 0.750 
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Table 2: Probit Model for the probability of being low-, medium-, and high pay (1995) 
 LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
  Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t 
Male -0.526 -8.80 0.099 2.15 0.438 6.57 
       
Age       
16-24 - - - - - - 
25-49 -0.724 -10.76 0.607 9.59 0.522 3.05 
50-65 -0.757 -7.67 0.535 6.66 0.650 3.58 
       
Education       
Primary Ed. 0.254 2.74 0.191 3.02 -0.548 -6.77 
Second. Ed 0.109 1.12 0.220 3.38 -0.294 -3.69 
Tertiary Ed. - - - - - - 
       
Part-time job -0.320 -3.30 0.023 0.27 0.522 3.48 
       
On-the-job training -0.304 -3.83 -0.202 -4.08 0.325 5.47 
       
Type of firm       
Public -0.736 -8.62 -0.088 -1.55 0.822 11.01 
Private (<50) - - - - - - 
Private (50-500) -0.417 -5.46 0.105 1.76 0.442 5.23 
Private (>500) -0.554 -4.46 -0.415 -5.67 0.960 10.72 
       
Permanent Contract -0.478 -7.01 0.134 2.32 0.598 6.49 
       
Prev. unemployed 0.157 2.71 0.059 1.29 -0.379 -5.64 
       
Job duration       
<2 years - - - - - - 
2 – 5 years -0.141 -1.85 0.156 2.29 0.117 0.96 
> 5 years -0.335 -4.24 -0.020 -0.30 0.404 3.88 
       
Occupation       
Legislators, senior officials and managers -0.560 -2.32 -0.630 -4.69 1.254 8.01 
Professionals -0.995 -5.62 -0.971 -10.40 1.698 14.30 
Technicians and associate professionals -0.617 -4.88 -0.245 -3.00 0.868 8.04 
Clerks -0.448 -4.39 0.207 2.72 0.329 3.08 
Service workers and shop and market sales workers - - - - - - 
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers 0.462 2.33 0.045 0.24   
Craft and related trade workers -0.051 -0.52 0.160 2.01 0.109 0.93 
Plant and machine operators and assemblers -0.026 -0.24 0.059 0.67 0.168 1.31 
Elementary occupations 0.038 0.46 0.107 1.48 -0.431 -3.06 
       
Type of industry       
Agriculture 0.256 1.94 -0.376 -3.08 -0.591 -1.48 
Industry -0.380 -5.23 0.068 1.25 0.180 2.36 
Services - - - - - - 
Constant 0.815 6.51 -0.561 -5.68 -2.943 -14.19 
N 4,516 4,516 4,516 
Log likelihood -1,535 -2,770 -1,368 
Predicted probability 0.197 0.542 0.265 
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Table 3: Probit Model (with sample selection) for the probability of being low-paid 
 Coef. t 
   
Male -0.496 -15.08 
   
Age   
16-24 - - 
25-49 -0.669 -16.99 
50-65 -0.751 -13.51 
   
Education   
Primary Ed. 0.304 6.64 
Second. Ed 0.167 3.48 
Tertiary Ed. - - 
   
Part-time job -0.232 -4.47 
   
On-the-job training -0.348 -8.46 
   
Type of firm   
Public -0.741 -15.49 
Private (<50) - - 
Private (50-500) -0.498 -11.81 
Private (>500) -0.551 -7.86 
   
Permanent Contract -0.474 -13.53 
   
Prev. unemployed 0.075 2.48 
   
Job duration   
<2 years - - 
2 – 5 years -0.127 -3.03 
> 5 years -0.381 -9.53 
   
Occupation   
Legislators, senior officials and managers -0.573 -3.53 
Professionals -0.496 -5.94 
Technicians and associate professionals - - 
Clerks -0.073 -1.14 
Service workers and shop and market sales workers 0.414 7.39 
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers 0.498 4.31 
Craft and related trade workers 0.296 4.75 
Plant and machine operators and assemblers 0.334 5.03 
Elementary occupations 0.478 8.24 
   
Type of industry   
Agriculture 0.504 6.68 
Industry -0.375 -9.36 
Services - - 
   
Year dummies   
Y95 - - 
Y96 -0.453 -11.27 
Y97 -0.528 -11.99 
Y98 -0.433 -9.30 
Y99 -0.466 -8.82 
Y00 -0.648 -10.52 
   
Constant 1.147 10.58 
ρ 0.259 1.94 
N 16,623 
Log likelihood -15,178 
LR test (ρ=0) :    χ2(1)=3.38 ,     Prob >   χ2(1) = 0.066 
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Table 4: Competing risks model WITHOUT unobserved heterogeneity 
 Failure 1: Change job Failure 2: Transitions 
to non-employment 
 Coeff. t Coeff. t 
ln(t) -0.940 -15.12 -1.530 -44.60 
ln(t)2 0.313 18.82 0.438 44.70 
     
Male -0.054 -1.10 -0.017 -0.60 
     
Age     
16-24 - - - - 
25-49 -0.192 -2.50 -0.302 -7.25 
50-65 -0.329 -3.61 -0.519 -10.03 
     
Education     
Primary Ed. - - - - 
Second. Ed -0.006 -0.10 0.046 1.29 
Tertiary Ed. -0.044 -0.65 0.070 1.78 
     
Part-time job -0.111 -1.09 -0.021 -0.37 
     
On-the-job training -0.019 -0.37 -0.057 -1.85 
     
Type of firm     
Public -0.127 -2.12 -0.130 -3.58 
Private (<50) - - - - 
Private (50-500) -0.082 -1.30 -0.063 -1.72 
Private (>500) -0.083 -1.01 -0.108 -2.13 
     
Permanent Contract -0.225 -4.02 -0.441 -13.70 
     
Prev. unemployed 0.241 5.09 0.229 8.27 
     
Low pay 0.806 8.18 0.591 11.43 
     
Low pay * ln(t) -0.483 -9.39 -0.410 -13.94 
     
Occupation     
Legislators, senior officials and managers 0.118 0.81 0.060 0.67 
Professionals -0.022 -0.25 0.014 0.26 
Technicians and associate professionals - - - - 
Clerks 0.016 0.18 -0.022 -0.41 
Service workers and shop and market sales workers 0.068 0.78 0.056 1.08 
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers 0.256 1.29 0.052 0.41 
Craft and related trade workers 0.119 1.31 0.055 1.01 
Plant and machine operators and assemblers 0.016 0.16 0.086 1.46 
Elementary occupations 0.127 1.36 0.101 1.84 
     
Type of industry     
Agriculture 0.064 0.48 0.084 1.04 
Industry -0.028 -0.47 0.023 0.65 
Services - - - - 
     
Year dummies     
Y95 - - - - 
Y96 0.402 8.64 -0.116 -3.78 
Y97 0.532 11.31 -0.189 -6.03 
Y98 0.675 12.52 -0.347 -8.91 
Y99 1.128 15.61 -0.698 -11.36 
Y00 1.325 14.16 -0.958 -11.71 
     
Unem. Rate 0.213 13.36 -0.199 -16.61 
     
Constant -8.877 -23.88 2.377 8.65 
N Spells 206,214 
Log likelihood -40,350 
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Table 5: Competing risks model WITH unobserved heterogeneity 
 Failure 1: Change job Failure 2: Transitions to 
non-employment 
 Coef t Coef t 
ln(t) -2.074 -23.41 -3.036 -59.09 
ln(t)2 0.784 25.61 1.086 60.16 
     
Male -0.091 -1.71 -0.027 -0.78 
     
Age     
16-24 - - - - 
25-49 -0.138 -1.62 -0.429 -7.86 
50-65 -0.378 -3.76 -0.847 -13.12 
     
Education     
Primary Ed. - - - - 
Second. Ed 0.003 0.05 0.009 0.21 
Tertiary Ed. 0.050 0.67 0.137 2.89 
     
Part-time job -0.118 -1.05 -0.015 -0.22 
     
On-the-job training -0.030 -0.55 -0.081 -2.24 
     
Type of firm     
Public -0.169 -2.57 -0.238 -5.61 
Private (<50)     
Private (50-500) -0.109 -1.58 -0.122 -2.81 
Private (>500) -0.091 -1.02 -0.132 -2.20 
     
Permanent Contract -0.259 -4.10 -0.696 -17.64 
     
Prev. unemployed 0.344 6.55 0.435 12.77 
     
Low pay 0.647 6.38 0.533 8.50 
     
Low pay * ln(t) -0.443 -8.45 -0.414 -12.02 
     
Occupation     
Legislators, senior officials and managers 0.109 0.70 -0.061 -0.61 
Professionals -0.066 -0.68 -0.050 -0.82 
Technicians and associate professionals - - - - 
Clerks 0.018 0.19 -0.048 -0.78 
Service workers and shop and market sales workers 0.102 1.07 0.073 1.17 
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers 0.429 2.01 0.117 0.74 
Craft and related trade workers 0.162 1.62 -0.003 -0.04 
Plant and machine operators and assemblers 0.063 0.57 0.059 0.85 
Elementary occupations 0.195 1.89 0.088 1.33 
     
Type of industry     
Agriculture -0.003 -0.02 -0.013 -0.13 
Industry -0.034 -0.51 0.032 0.73 
Services - - - - 
     
Year dummies     
Y95 - - - - 
Y96 0.374 7.32 -0.274 -7.48 
Y97 0.556 10.82 -0.345 -9.13 
Y98 0.685 11.67 -0.498 -10.77 
Y99 1.244 15.52 -0.848 -11.37 
Y00 1.502 14.23 -1.110 -11.43 
     
Unem. Rate 0.275 15.40 -0.169 -11.58 
     
Constant -9.992 -24.04 2.608 7.72 
u1 0.833 24.78 0.833 24.78 
pr 0.843 156.44 0.843 156.44 
N Spells 206,214 
Log likelihood -32,800 
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